Nato must show it is serious about defending its eastern flank

Would Vladimir Putin send Russian troops into one of the Baltic states, knowing this would trigger a direct war with Nato? There is no room for complacency; until Russian tanks rolled across Ukraine’s borders on February 24, that too seemed unthinkable. EU and G7 summits in the past few days have committed to stepping up support to Ukraine — which on Monday suffered a horrific missile attack on a shopping centre in Kremenchuk — and to tightening sanctions that have sapped Russia’s economy and put it on course for its first debt default since 1998. Tuesday’s Nato summit in Madrid is a moment for the alliance to demonstrate that it comprehends the magnitude of the threat from the Kremlin — and is ready and equipped to defend against any Russian attempt to go beyond Ukraine and attack Nato’s eastern flank.

Estonia’s prime minister Kaja Kallas warned last week her country would be “wiped off the map” under existing Nato plans that would allow the Baltic republics to be overrun in any Russian invasion, before liberating them after 180 days. Even as she spoke, Moscow was threatening “serious negative” consequences to nearby Lithuania after it barred rail transfer of some goods to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad — though Vilnius said it was merely applying EU sanctions.

Brussels has attempted to calm the tensions. But the incident underlined the sensitivity of the three Baltic states, occupied by the Soviet Union for half a century — and of the Suwałki Gap, the Polish-Lithuanian border strip between Kaliningrad and Belarus, which, if seized by Russia, could cut off the Baltics from Nato.

Plans to be endorsed by Nato in Madrid go less far than Kallas would have liked. They are pivotal nonetheless. The alliance is rightly moving from a “tripwire” concept, under which Nato stationed about 1,000 foreign troops in each country to deter invasion, to a focus on a full and rapid defence of allied territory. Nato will put several thousand troops in each Baltic state, and expand its rapid reaction force from 40,000 to 300,000, ready to start deploying to specific eastern locations — where they will have trained and completed exercises — within hours of an attack. More heavy weapons, logistics and command-and-control assets will be pre-positioned.

This is in part a reversion to the Cold War-era model, when Nato’s top commander knew exactly which forces were on standby, where, and how quickly they could move. Yet many lessons on deterrence, defence and signalling have been forgotten in the three decades since, and must be relearnt.

It is vital, too, to put in place the monitoring, decision-making and logistics needed to enable forces to be swiftly deployed. So is the funding to ensure adequate levels of readiness are constantly maintained. Nine Nato states now meet the target of spending 2 per cent of economic output on defence; 19 more have “clear plans” to do so by 2024. Yet Western allies have made too many declarations since Russia seized Crimea and parts of east Ukraine in 2014, without proper implementation. The priority is to convince Putin — who some officials fear does not think Nato’s defence of the Baltics is credible — that the alliance’s security guarantees apply equally across all members.

The alliance could have presented a more compelling image of solidarity, however, were Turkey not still blocking membership for Finland and Sweden over their links to Kurdish separatists. Appearances matter. The north Atlantic alliance is, belatedly, adopting a strategic concept that recognises Russia as the “most significant and direct threat” to its security. But, as in the Cold War, Nato allies must be ready once more to put serious effort and expense into preparing for something it hopes will never happen — with the aim of making sure that it never does.