Europe’s Franco-German motor needs mending

“Olalaf!” exclaimed the front page of France’s Libération on the tensions in Franco-German relations before chancellor Olaf Scholz’s Paris lunch with Emmanuel Macron on Wednesday. The two leaders’ meeting replaced a broader annual summit of French and German ministers in Fontainebleau that was postponed after a clutch of disagreements that led Macron last week to warn that Berlin risked “isolating itself” in Europe. It is wrong to overplay this breach; the EU, thanks in part to Franco-German co-operation, has shown surprising solidarity during the war in Ukraine. Yet if this unity is to hold as the conflict enters a more dangerous phase, Paris and Berlin each need to pay heed to the concerns of the other.

For all the talk of the Franco-German “motor” that drives the EU, the bloc’s two largest economies are often at odds. But they have shown a capacity to come together on key issues, often in crises. It can be at such moments that the EU takes real steps forward, most recently with the €750bn Covid-19 recovery fund in 2020. But this ability to find compromises that transcend national interests now seems in short supply.

Newly elected leaders in either capital also tend to explore new ways of doing things and new “constellations” in Europe. Scholz’s championing of EU enlargement to the western Balkans and Ukraine — however distant a prospect — has stirred old concerns in Paris. Paris frets a shift of Berlin’s attention towards the east could undermine the Franco-German alliance.

There are more immediate gripes. Germany opposed an EU-wide cap on gas prices that France supported, though this was an ill-conceived proposal. More importantly, Paris and some other capitals view Berlin’s surprise €200bn plan last month to protect businesses and households from high gas prices as evidence of a “Germany first” mentality that could distort the single market. France wants Germany to back an EU-wide scheme to safeguard European economies, akin to the Covid fund.

France is unhappy, too, that Germany is spending a chunk of the extra €100bn funding it unveiled for defence on US F-35 fighters, rather than buying European-made equipment and boosting the continent’s defence industry. German officials play down the differences. For its part, though, Berlin is unhappy over France’s hostility to a gas pipeline that would connect Spain’s liquefied natural gas terminals to northern Europe via the Pyrenees.

Senior French politicians would be well advised to tone down their public criticisms of Berlin — a gift to a Kremlin constantly searching for EU divisions it can exploit. Yet while there may be some substance to Berlin’s suspicions that Paris is looking out for its domestic interests under the guise of commitment to “Europe”, German officials should not brush off French concerns.

With consumers this winter facing soaring bills and possible shortages thanks to Vladimir Putin’s weaponisation of energy, there is a strong case for a new Franco-German bargain on an “energy union”. Both countries stand to benefit long-term, like Europe more broadly, from an EU-wide approach to policy, security, networks and markets.

Despite differences of style between the pragmatic, technocratic Scholz and the idealistic Macron, moreover, there is scope to find common ground. An August speech by the German chancellor calling for a “geopolitical” and “sovereign” Europe echoed some favourite themes of the French president, though focused more on institutional reforms than grand vision. How the EU operates does need rethinking for the future. Today, however, as it prepares to face its sternest tests since the Ukraine war began, Europe needs its Franco-German motor to be fully functioning.