Read the Church Committee Open Letter

These topics raise questions regarding possible domestic abuses or misjudgments by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies — similar to those confronted by the Church Committee, but in a new and different context.

The Church Committee was cited as a paradigm for Congressional investigations by Paul C. Light at NYU’s Wagner School of Public Service, after examining investigations extending over a 67-year period in Government by Investigation: Congress, Presidents, and the Search for Answers, 1945-2012 (Brookings Institution, 2014).

Light pointed to three key ingredients the Church Committee shared with the most effective Congressional investigations.

First, the most successful Congressional investigations were bipartisan. The Church Committee was launched by a Senate vote of 82 to 4, after a 1974 New York Times report about Nixon-era CIA domestic surveillance on U.S. anti-war and civil rights activists. This triggered the Committee’s sweeping investigations of U.S. intelligence activities through the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations.

The final Church Committee reports were exhaustively documented, running over 2,700 pages. They criticized certain intelligence activities as imprudent or improper under both Democratic and Republican presidents.

The Committee’s ultimate recommendations transcended political lines: creating a permanent intelligence oversight committee; promulgating presidential orders and Attorney General guidelines; and legislating a secure judicial procedure for authorizing national security electronic surveillances (eventually, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act).

As chair, Frank Church worked closely not only with fellow Democrats, but with the panel’s Republicans, including Vice Chairman John Tower (Texas), Howard Baker (Tennessee), Charles Mathias (Maryland), and Richard Schweiker (Pennsylvania).

Republican members did not hesitate to debate fine points of Committee procedures and findings. But they strongly supported the essential investigative mission. John Tower worked closely with Church and Gary Hart (Colorado) on CIA assassination plots. Senators Baker and Mathias were instrumental in maintaining bipartisan unity during closed and open sessions, penetrating questioning of former intelligence officials, and shaping Committee findings.

Civility and mutual respect marked Committee deliberations and staff relations. Majority counsel routinely included minority counsel in witness interviews and closed door deposition questioning of former intelligence agency or White House witnesses. While separate concurring or dissenting views were included in Committee findings, Democratic majority Senators made an effort to refine certain findings to achieve bipartisan consensus wherever possible.

Second, effective committee leadership was essential to the most successful Congressional investigations. For the Church Committee, this meant collaborative leadership. Church consulted frequently with Tower and Baker to present a united front to the intelligence

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