Key Findings From the Jan. 6 Committee’s Report, Annotated

13. The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies did successfully detect the planning for potential violence on Jan. 6, including planning specifically by the Proud Boys and Oath Keeper militia groups who ultimately led the attack on the Capitol. As Jan. 6 approached, the intelligence specifically identified the potential for violence at the Capitol. This intelligence was shared within the executive branch, including with the Secret Service and the president’s National Security Council.

14. Intelligence gathered in advance of Jan. 6 did not support a conclusion that antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage in a violent counterdemonstration, or attack Trump supporters on Jan. 6. Indeed, intelligence from Jan. 5 indicated that some left-wing groups were instructing their members to “stay at home” and not attend on Jan. 6. Ultimately, none of these groups was involved to any material extent with the attack on the Capitol on Jan. 6.

15. Neither the intelligence community nor law enforcement obtained intelligence in advance of Jan. 6 on the full extent of the ongoing planning by President Trump, John Eastman, Rudolph Giuliani and their associates to overturn the certified election results. Such agencies apparently did not (and potentially could not) anticipate the provocation President Trump would offer the crowd in his Ellipse speech, that President Trump would “spontaneously” instruct the crowd to march to the Capitol, that President Trump would exacerbate the violent riot by sending his 2:24 p.m. tweet condemning Vice President Pence, or the full scale of the violence and lawlessness that would ensue. Nor did law enforcement anticipate that President Trump would refuse to direct his supporters to leave the Capitol once violence began. No intelligence community advance analysis predicted exactly how President Trump would behave; no such analysis recognized the full scale and extent of the threat to the Capitol on Jan. 6.

Annotation for 13, 14 and 15: The committee has faced criticism, especially from Republicans, for not focusing more attention on the failures by intelligence and law enforcement officials on Jan. 6 and in the weeks leading up to the Capitol attack. But the panel did present some preliminary findings and may ultimately issue a separate report.

16. Hundreds of Capitol and D.C. Metropolitan Police officers performed their duties bravely on Jan. 6, and America owes those individual immense gratitude for their courage in the defense of Congress and our constitution. Without their bravery, Jan. 6 would have been far worse. Although certain members of the Capitol Police leadership regarded their approach to Jan. 6 as “all hands on deck” the Capitol Police leadership did not have sufficient assets in place to address the violent and lawless crowd. Capitol Police leadership did not anticipate the scale of the violence that would ensue after President Trump instructed tens of thousands of his supporters in the Ellipse crowd to march to the Capitol, and then tweeted at 2:24 p.m. Although Chief Steven Sund raised the idea of National Guard support, the Capitol Police Board did not request Guard assistance prior to Jan. 6. The Metropolitan Police took an even more proactive approach to Jan. 6, and deployed roughly 800 officers, including responding to the emergency calls for help at the Capitol. Rioters still managed to break their line in certain locations, when the crowd surged forward in the immediate aftermath of Donald Trump’s 2:24 p.m. tweet. The Department of Justice readied a group of federal agents at Quantico and in the District of Columbia, anticipating that Jan. 6 could become violent, and then deployed those agents once it became clear that police at the Capitol were overwhelmed. Agents from the Department of Homeland Security were also deployed to assist.

17. President Trump had authority and responsibility to direct deployment of the National Guard in the District of Columbia, but never gave any order to deploy the National Guard on Jan. 6 or on any other day. Nor did he instruct any federal law enforcement agency to assist. Because the authority to deploy the National Guard had been delegated to the Department of Defense, the secretary of defense could, and ultimately did, deploy the Guard. Although evidence identifies a likely miscommunication between members of the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense impacting the timing of deployment, the committee has found no evidence that the Department of Defense intentionally delayed deployment of the National Guard. The select committee recognizes that some at the department had genuine concerns, counseling caution, that President Trump might give an illegal order to use the military in support of his efforts to overturn the election.

Annotation: The question of why it took so long to deploy the National Guard to the Capitol is one of the enduring mysteries of Jan. 6. While the committee sharply criticized Mr. Trump for failing to taking action that day, it also found that there was no evidence the deployment of the Guard was delayed for political reasons.